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INTRODUCTION
Five philosophies of law dominate the conversation in con-
temporary Anglo-American jurisprudence. The law and eco-
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nomics school uses the concept of economic efficiency to
analyze and evaluate the law.' Legal rules are deemed justifi-
able to the extent to which they maximize the total wealth of
society. Legal positivism sharply distinguishes between law
and morality, offers a nonideological conception of law and
holds that judges have discretion in the sense that the law fails
to compel unique resolutions of many legal disputes. 2 Ronald
Dworkin opposes positivism. He claims that no clear line can
be drawn between law and morality and that the law is determi-
nate in the sense that for any legal question there is one cor-
rect answer. 3 Natural law theory maintains that law should be
evaluated teleologically by asking how well it protects natural
rights and promotes the common good.4 The critical legal
studies movement attacks the other schools from the Left. It
claims that legal rules can be manipulated to serve conflicting
political ends and urges lawyers to use their skills in creating a
socialist society.
Of all these approaches the critical legal studies movement is
perhaps the least well understood by the community of law-
yers. I shall try to remedy at least some of the lack of under-
standing by providing an exposition of some of the
movement's leading themes.
There are at least three ways to write such an exposition.
First, one could characterize the movement as a whole without
sustained reference to any particular writer or writers. The
drawback of this method is that many purport to speak on be-
half of the critical legal studies movement and disagree among
themselves. A general characterization would risk oversimplfi-
cation and misstatement. Second, one might describe the the-
ories of all or most of those claiming to represent the
movement. One of the difficulties with this approach is that an
adequate description of the writers who would have to be dis-
cussed would exceed any reasonable length for a paper of this
kind. Third, one might select for intensive review one of the
leading critical legal studies writers in the hope that his or her
ideas are sufficiently representative.
I have chosen the third method. I shall focus upon the theo-
1. See, e.g, R.A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (3d ed. 1986).
2. See, e.g., H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW (1961).
3. See R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1977).
4. See, e.g., J. FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS (1980).
19871
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ries of Roberto Mangabiera Unger, one of the generally ac-
knowledged leaders of the movement.
5
I shall concentrate primarily upon ideas Unger sets out in
The Critical Legal Studies Movement. 6 But Unger develops certain
underlying philosophical and political principles in earlier
writings which should be kept in mind when reading his later
work. After setting out what I take to be Unger's overall pic-
ture in Part I, I shall sketch some of these underlying concep-
tions in Part II. In Part III I describe the main elements of
Unger's view of the critical legal studies movement. In Part IV
I offer some brief evaluative comments.
I have found Unger's writings very obscure, even as mea-
sured by the modest standards of political philosophy. His lan-
guage is excessively abstract. He rarely offers examples. Many
of his sentences are cumbersome and too long. He almost
never presents arguments. I have often been unsure of his
meaning. I mention this only to put the reader on notice that
the interpretation I offer is certainly not the only one that
could be lifted from Unger's work. Of course, the best evi-
dence of Unger's intentions is his own writing.
It seems best to begin with Unger's political vision, for it is
this vision which underpins his entire theory. At risk of over-
simplification I shall briefly describe in very general terms his
basic conception. In Parts II and III I shall provide some of
the details.
I. UNGER'S OVERALL VISION
Unger is a communitarian socialist. He believes that a truly
just society would create and maintain the conditions for genu-
ine equality by eliminating heirarchies of economic, social,
political and legal power. Such a society would consist of a
class of relatively small "organic" communities in which the
sentiments of love and solidarity were fully expressed in the
members' mutual relationships. In such communities the full
humanity of each person would flourish free from artificial
5. The critical legal studies movement has generated a huge amount of litera-
ture. See, e.g., Kelman, Interpretive Construction in the Substantive Criminal Law, 33 STAN.
L. REV. 591 (1981); Kennedy, The Structure of Blackstone's Commentaries, 28 BUFFALO L.
REV. 205 (1979); Tushnet, Following the Rules Laid Down: A Critique of Interpretivism and
Neutral Principles, 96 HARV. L. REV. 781 (1983); Critical Legal Studies Symposium, 36
STAN. L. REV. 1-674 (1984).
6. See R.M. UNGER, THE CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES MOVEMENT (1986).
[Vol. 13
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constraint. The classic socialist principle would provide the
principle of economic distribution: from each according to his
ability, to each according to his need.
Unger is ambivalent about the question of collectivist con-
trol. On the one hand, he says many things suggesting that his
ideal socialist state would not be totalitarian. The state would
provide basic economic guidance for the organic communities
but would protect political, social and economic freedoms.
The principle of decision-making at all levels would be demo-
cratic. On the other hand, it seems that this ideal society
would bring with it a vastly enlarged governmental apparatus
whose potential for coercive control would far exceed anything
now existing in our system.
Contrary to classical Marxist theory,7 this just society can be
created by democratic means from the materials of present
American society. Each person who becomes convinced of the
desirability and possibility of creating socialism will find ways
of working toward that ideal from within his or her occupa-
tional role. Lawyers have their own part to play in the struggle
for the radical transformation of society. The law consists of
rules which can be manipulated for various political ends. The
law is not a monolothic structure which mechanically deter-
mines resolutions of conflicts. Lawyers dedicating themselves
to working for true community and equality will discover,
through Unger's guidance, the necessary tools of action.
A fully human life is possible only within a truly just society.
But in the meantime we can approximate full humanity by
working to make that ideal actual. In fact, only by participating
in the revolutionary struggle for equality can we find personal
integration. Lawyers typically lead fragmented lives dedicated
to the arbitrary desires of clients and to the cynical mas-
terminding of sordid power plays. Through becoming fully
conscious participants in the cause for true community, law-
yers will transcend these disintegrating forces and will find the
deep fulfillment of a unified consciousness.
II. EARLIER THEMES
In this section I shall present some of the themes Unger dis-
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cusses in writings published before The Critical Legal Studies
Movement.8 These earlier themes illuminate the general argu-
ment of that book.
A. The Good is Definable as the Realization of Human Nature
One of Unger's pervasive themes is the claim that good and
evil are the ultimate categories of moral evaluation. 9 Thus, a
legal system should be evaluated by determining the extent to
which it realizes the good.' 0 Because the category of the good
is basic to Unger's enterprise, it is important to understand his
definition of goodness.
Unger defines the good in terms of human nature."' The
good is the realization of human nature.' 2 Thus, a legal system
is justifiable to the extent to which it promotes the realization
of human nature.'
3
The definition of the good as the realization of human na-
ture presupposes two kinds of harmony, one within the self
and one between the self and the world. With respect to the
former, Unger assumes that the self is so constituted that gen-
uine realization and happiness are possible.' 4 With respect to
the latter he assumes that there are no metaphysical factors
precluding human fulfillment.'5
B. The Essence of Human Nature Would be Fully Revealed Only in
an Ideal Society
Because the standard for evaluating the justice of a society is
human nature, it is important to investigate that essence. To
the extent to which we are unclear about human nature we are
unclear about the good.
In contrast to philosophers who deny the existence of signif-
icant similarities among humans, Unger asserts the existence
of an essence shared by all.' 6 But he also says that this essence
8. R.M. UNGER, supra note 6.
9. See, e.g., R.M. UNGER, KNOWLEDGE AND POLITICS 238-48 (1975).
10. See, e.g., id., ch. 4, at 145-90 (critiquing the "welfare-corporate" state).
11. Id. at 237.
12. See id at 239, 245.
13. See id. at 237.
14. See id. at 247.
15. See id.
16. See R.M. UNGER, LAW IN MODERN SOCIETY 42 (1976).
[Vol. 13
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changes. 17 Like any universal, the human essence is trans-
formed by history. There are no fixed essences of the kind
postulated by Aristotle.'
8
One factor which transforms the human essence is knowl-
edge itself. 19 Each thing must be defined by its relations with
everything else in the universe. 20 For the human knower there
can be no intelligible distinction between the "objective" na-
ture of these interrelationships and their "meaning" to him.2'
For, the very distinction between the "objective" nature of a
relation and its "subjective" apprehension by a knowing sub-
ject presupposes the impossible project of escaping from one's
own perspective. 22 Hence, every act of knowing transforms
the object known in the sense that the object now has a new
relationship with some thing (viz., the knowing subject) which
changes it.23 Now, the case of the human knower knowing the
human essence is only a special case of the general case of the
knower apprehending a universal. Hence, the very attempt to
understand the human essence transforms it.24
Not only does the attempt to know the human essence
change that essence, but the forms of social life themselves
transform it. Human nature is "reinvented and transformed
by each new form of social life; indeed, by every individual." 2
5
It might seem that this situation makes it impossible to know
the human essence. If every attempt to know it changes it, and
if every form of social life changes it, how could the essence
ever "stand still" long enough to be understood? One might
even question the intelligibility of talking about essences at all
under such conditions.
But matters are not hopeless. Unger believes that we can be
sure of one thing: wherever there is "domination" of some
persons by others, human nature cannot show itself.26 In a so-
ciety with no forms of domination, legal, political, economic or
17. Id.
18. See KNOWLEDGE AND POLITICS, supra note 9, at 203.
19. Id. at 203-04.
20. See id. at 203.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 203-04.
23. Id. at 204.
24. See id.
25. LAW IN MODERN SOCIETY, supra note 16, at 42.
26. KNOWLEDGE AND POLITICS, supra note 9, at 247.
1987]
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social, human nature will reveal itself as it is.27 Thus, there is a
sense in which we cannot fully know the human essence until
we observe it in a just society.
C. The Ideal Society Would be a Society of Organic Groups
A good society would be a genuine community. A genuine
community would be a community in which persons shared
purposes in whose moral legitimacy they believed and in which
each member treated every other as a "concrete and com-
plete" being.28 True community would encourage the expres-
sion of mutual benevolence. 29 Such benevolence would take
the form of a sentiment of solidarity.30 A person experiences
the emotion of solidarity to the extent to which he feels re-
sponsible for those whose lives touch his and to the extent to
which he is willing to share their fate. 31 Solidarity is concern
with another as a person rather than as an occupier of a social
role or as an abstract bearer of legal rights.3 2
Unger's term for a genuine community is "organic group."3
3
The good can be realized only in an organic group. In such a
community, everyone would recognize the "concrete individu-
ality of his fellows. . .. "34 No one would treat another as a
mere occupier of a social or legal role.3 5 Everyone would ex-
perience everyone else as working toward the same goals. No
one would experience another as an "antagonistic" will.3 6
An organic group must satisfy two conditions. First, it must
be possible and likely that each member would have many
"face-to-face dealings" with all the other members.3 7 Second,
each member must live with the others in many different social
circumstances so that everyone learns to experience everyone
else as a "concrete individual."38
These two conditions make it necessary that an organic
27. See id.
28. Id. at 184.




33. KNOWLEDGE AND -POLITICS, supra note 9, at 259-62.
34. Id. at 260.
35. See id. at 261.
36. Id.
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group be relatively small and characterized by many different
purposes. 39 And since each group must be small there will
have to be a great many organic groups within the society, each
one based upon a "distinct set of common experiences and
shared purposes." 4
0
A society of organic groups would have to sacrifice much ef-
ficiency in terms of production of goods and services. 4 1 Such
sacrifice would be required by the drastic decentralization and
by the multipurpose activities within each group.42
One of the inherent dangers in a society of organic groups
would be the temptation to think that any existing community
sufficed as a "final expression of the good." 43 This temptation
might lead to the oppression of group members and to the
suppression of dissent.44 All members of the society would
have to keep well in mind the "transitory and limited character
of all forms of group life as manifestations of human nature." 45
Within each organic group, all important decisions would be
made democratically. Unger calls such an arrangement a "de-
mocracy of ends." 46 Decisions regarding what to produce,
how to produce and for what purposes would be political
choices and open to debate and collective decision. 47 In par-
ticipating in such debates and in voting on such issues, each
member should keep uppermost in mind the genuine good of
the community.48 No member should act from purely self-in-
terested motives.
The ultimate standard of distribution within each organic
group would be the socialist principle of giving to each person
what he needs for the development of his personality. 49 How-
ever, in the beginning it might be necessary to distribute on
the basis of both merit and need. 50 As each organic group ma-
tures, it will acquire a better understanding of human needs
39. See id.
40. Id. at 279.
41. Id. at 265.
42. Id.
43. See id. at 266-67.
44. See id.
45. Id. at 267.
46. Id. at 268.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 270.
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and will be able to more closely approximate the ideal of distri-
bution on the basis of need.5'
The rigid division of labor characterizing Western democra-
cies should be broken down within the organic groups. 52 Per-
sons who exercise power over others in one respect should be
made subject to those others in other respects.53 No one
should be allowed to combine within himself a variety of pow-
ers over others. Systematic rotation of tasks and occupations
should be required.54 No one should be forced or allowed to
spend much time at any one task. Some tasks would be dis-
liked by everyone but would be necessary for the life of the
community. Those tasks should be assumed by all as a "com-
mon burden. '
'55
An organic group would be required to carefully protect the
freedom of its members. 56 Freedom can be defined as the
"measure of an individual's capacity to achieve the good." 57
True freedom requires that each organic group member have
certain legally protected rights against the group and against
other members. First, there would be freedom to join or leave
any group. 58 Second, each member would have a right to
speak freely on all issues.59 Third, each person would have
freedom to choose his work. 60 Finally, everyone would have a
right to belong to several organic groups at a time. 61
What would be the role of the state? One of its functions
would be standing above all of the organic groups and keeping
peace between them.62 Another would be the legal protection
of the personal freedoms of the members of the organic
groups. 63 The state would also establish the conditions under
which each organic group would relate to every other in the
same way that members of any particular organic group would
51. Id.




56. See id. at 278-79.
57. Id. at 278.
58. Id. at 279.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 280.
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be required to relate to each other." Thus, the state would
see to it that all the organic groups interacted in love, brother-
hood and solidarity.
D. Customs Rather Than Legal Rules Would Play the Primary Part
in Shaping the Life of the Organic Communities
The organic groups would replace governance by legal rule
with guidance by custom. 65 Customs are "tacit standards of
right that are actual patterns of conduct."66
The reason for replacing rules with customs is that no set of
rules could do justice to the emotion of solidarity which ties
together each organic group.67 The sentiment of solidarity re-
quires each person to take none of his legal rights for
granted. 68 A rights holder should always ask himself, prior to
exercising any of his rights, whether using his legal power in a
particular situation coheres with his ultimate purpose of "shar-
ing the burden" of all those whose lives touch his.69 Now, to
that question, there could never be a general answer formu-
lated in terms of a generally applicable rule. 70 As Unger says:
Everything will depend on issues like the degree to which
the other person has acted wrongly in the particular rela-
tionship and his ability to bear the loss that would result
from the exercise of the power. These are not factors that
can be made the basis of rules; instead, they are elements of
decision that bear on how one uses the rights allocated by
existing rules. 71
E. Genuine Communication Between Persons Can Exist
Only in an Organic Group
Human action must be understood in terms of the purposes
pursued through that action. 72 Two conditions must be satis-
fied in order for two persons to understand each other's ac-
tions and words. First, both must have the "same kind of
64. Id. at 282-83.
65. See LAw IN MODERN SOCIETY, supra note 16, at 241.
66. Id. at 251.




71. Id. at 207-08.
72. See id. at 246.
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being or mind." 73 Second, this potential similarity of mind
must be expressed in "shared experiences, understandings,
and values." ' 74 Such conditions could only be met within an
organic group.
F. Although the Transformation of Society into a True Community is
not an Historical Inevitability, We Have
Reason to be Optimistic
In spite of all the conflicting purposes dividing people, eve-
ryone has the overriding aim of affirming his humanity.
75
Thus, we all share the concern to create the conditions for true
fulfillment. 76 In time, this common sentiment may become so
strong that we will all be induced to work with each other in
the common cause of building a better society. 77
Further, there is reason to believe that divine providence is
working with us. 78 Although we cannot know God fully, we do
know that He is willing and able to help us in our struggle for
justice. As Unger puts it:
When philosophy has gained the truth of which it is capa-
ble, it passes into politics and prayer, politics through which
the world is changed, prayer through which men ask God to
complete the change of the world by carrying them into His
presence and giving them what, left to themselves, they
would always lack.79
III. UNGER'S CONCEPTION OF THE CRITICAL
LEGAL STUDIES MOVEMENT
A. The Formalist and Objectivist Conceptions of Law are Mistaken
Unger says that the critical legal studies movement began by
rejecting the formalist and objectivist theories of law. Formal-
ism is the belief that legal analysis does not involve ideological
or philosophical elements.80 Legal argument is not open-
ended debate about the fundamental conditions of society.8'
73. Id. at 258.
74. Id.
75. KNOWLEDGE AND POLITICS, supra note 9, at 230.
76. See id.
77. Id.
78. See id. at 294.
79. Id.
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Legal analysis bases itself upon "impersonal purposes, policies
and principles."8 2 It is "apolitical" in the sense that the lawyer
or judge analyzing or applying the law need not take any posi-
tion on the justice or desirability of the legal system. 83 There
is a basic contrast between lawmaking and law application.
While law application may sometimes involve creative effort in
the sense that the lawyer has to appeal to principles and poli-
cies, such appeal is qualitatively less controversial and more
determinate than the appeal to principles and policies in the
lawmaking context.8 4
A formalist believes that genuine "legal doctrine" is possible
only through the formalist method. Legal doctrine exists when
two conditions are satisfied: (1) lawyers are willing to base
their professional judgments on the institutionally defined
materials of a given collective tradition, i.e., cases, statutes,
regulations, etc.; and (2) lawyers purport to speak authorita-
tively from within such tradition for the purpose of influencing
the application of governmental power.85
Objectivism is the belief that the entire class of statutes, cases,
and legal concepts making up our legal system expresses a sin-
gle underlying scheme of human association which is morally
and philosophically justifiable.8 6 Thus, objectivism requires
more than the claim that our system of law is justifiable in the
sense that it is based upon an underlying theory of society
which is morally and philosophically justifiable. An objectivist
also believes that here is a unique correlation between the un-
derlying theory of society and the system of law. That it to say,
he claims that the underlying theory could be expressed only
in the way in which is it expressed by our law.8 7
This underlying scheme of human association which the ob-
jectivist thinks is uniquely expressed by our system of legal
rules has two elements: "democracy" and "the market." 88
Thus, the objectivist believes that the underlying scheme of
democratic government and free markets is morally defensible
and expressible only in the way in which it is currently ex-
82. Id.
83. See id. at 1-2.




88. Id. at 5.
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pressed by our law.8 9
The critical legal studies movement rejects objectivism."°
Repeated attempts to find the"universal legal language" of de-
mocracy and free markets shows that there is no such lan-
guage.9' Democracy and the market system can be embodied
in radically different legal systems. 92 Consider the relationship
between the free market system and the law of contracts. That
law contains two principles which contradict each other.9 3 On
the one hand, there is the principle of freedom to choose one's
contracting partner and freedom to choose the terms of the
bargain.9 4 On the other hand, there is the "counterprinciple"
that freedom of contract is not permitted to destroy the "com-
munal aspects of social life" and that grossly unfair agreements
are unenforceable. 95 There are two incompatable ways of un-
derstanding the relationship between the principle and
counterprinciple. On the one hand, one might understand the
counterprinciple as a relatively narrow, ad hoc qualification of
the basic principle of freedom of contract.9 6 On the other
hand, one might see the counterprinciple as basic and the prin-
ciple as governing a narrow set of extreme limiting cases. 97
Which conception expresses the true nature of a market sys-
tem? Unger says that neither does.9 8 Commitment to a market
system does not force us to accept either one. We are free to
combine a commitment to free markets with either under-
standing of the law of contracts.99
Thus, for the critical legal studies lawyer, the law is essen-
tially indeterminate.100 There is no necessary connection be-
tween an underlying adherence to democracy and markets and
the present state of the law. We are always free to change our
rules in different ways without forsaking belief in either demo-
89. See id. at 5-6.
90. See id. at 6.
91. Id.
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cratic government or free markets.' 0 '
The critical legal studies movement also rejects formal-
ism. 10 2 Every branch of legal doctrine must rely upon an un-
derlying vision of human society.' 0 3 Without such a guiding
conception legal reasoning is nothing more than a "game of
easy analogies."104 Unger says that a common experience of
lawyers and law students is having:
the disquieting sense of being able to argue too well or too
easily for too many conflicting solutions. Because every-
thing can be defended, nothing can; the analogy-mongering
must be brought to a halt. It must be possible to reject
some of the received understandings and decisions as mis-
taken and to do so by appealing to a background normative
theory of the branch of law in question or of the realm of
social practice governed by that part of the law.' 0 5
There is no way to correlate any single background vision of
society with the class of legal materials. Those materials al-
ways express conflicting values and visions. 10 6 But formalist
theory requires a unique correlation between the underlying
vision of society and the law. Otherwise, those applying the
law could not avoid open-ended ideological debate. 10
7
In an earlier work, Unger puts the case against formalism in
a somewhat different way. 10 8 There could be no adjudicative
method which did not rely on the personal values of the
judge. 0 9 Words lack "self-evident reference."" 0 Hence, the
meaning of the words in a rule must be determined by refer-
ence to the context and purpose of the rule." But the inten-
tion of prior lawmakers is never completely clear. 112 And there
is no set of shared values and understandings to which a judge
can refer.' '3 Our society is not an organic group. Hence, every
lawsuit forces the judge "to decide, at least implicitly, which of
101. See id. at 7-8.
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the competing sets of belief in a given society should be given
priority."' 14
B. A Critical Legal Studies Lawyer Should Help Develop
and Apply Deviationist Doctrine
A Marxist lawyer regards legal doctrine as a mask for the
underying capitalistic order and therefore unworthy of serious
attention. In contrast, a critical legal studies lawyer takes legal
doctrine seriously. That is, he commits himself to working
with the concrete materials of the legal system, (statutes, cases,
regulations), claiming that the results of that work are morally
justifiable and worthy of influencing governmental power."15
Unger's term for the kind of legal doctrine critical legal stud-
ies lawyers ought to develop is deviationist doctrine. ' 6 Devia-
tionist doctrine openly uses moral, philosophical, and
ideological conceptions and ideals." 1 7 It makes no pretense of
applying or developing the law in a nonideological way.' 8 De-
viationist doctrine makes every legal question a springboard
for raising the issue of the kind of society we ought to have." 19
That is, the critical legal studies lawyer will transform every
discussion of legal doctrine into a conversation about the good
society. 120
C. Deviationist Doctrine May Proceed Either by the Method of
Internal Development or by the Method of Visionary Insight
Deviationist doctrine may proceed in either one of two
ways.' 2 ' One method is that of internal development.' 22 This
method starts with the materials of the present legal order and
focuses upon conflicts of two kinds. First, it points to conflicts
between principles and counterprinciples.' 23 That is, it calls
attention to tensions between rules which arise from conflict-
ing social ideals. 124 Second, it points to conflicts between an
114. Id.
115. See THE CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES MOVEMENT, supra note 6, at 15.
116. Id.
117. See id. at 16.
118. See id.
119. Id. at 17.
120. See id.
121. See id. at 18-19.
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underlying social ideal and its legal realization. 25 That is, it
looks for discrepancies between an ideal and its approximation
by the law.' 2
6
Having described such conflicts within the law, the method
of internal development endorses one of the social ideals un-
derlying the law and imagines the system transformed so as to
more closely approximate that ideal. 127 If possible, the
method will transform the law in fact as well as in imagina-
tion.' 28 It may then revise its ideal conception of society in
light of its new practical embodiment. 29 Then it will imagine
and instantiate yet another exemplification of the ideal, and so
on indefinitely. 1
30
The assumption of the method of internal development is
that the legal system already exemplifies all the available social
ideals in varying degrees and that it is politically possible to
peacefully work toward one of those ideals.' 3 ' The method be-
gins with the legal system as it is, seeking to transform it from
within into an actualization of the potential good lying dor-
mant in statutes and cases.1
3 2
The second method of deviationist doctrine is beginning
with a "visionary insight" into a reordered society and compar-
ing that ideal with the present legal system. 33 It then tries to
transform the system into a realization of the ideal.1
3 4
Unger says that there is no clearcut distinction between the
two methods. 35 On the surface it may appear that the internal
critic begins with the present system and works for its internal
transformation, whereas the visionary critic starts with an ideal
and tries to lift the society to that ideal. But, in reality, even
the visionary critic can persuade people only because the ideals
he invokes are already at work in the society.' 36 Further,
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imagines them transformed into "organizing conceptions and
practices." 137
D. The Critique of Objectivism Results in a Redefinition of the
Institutional Forms of Democracy and the Market
As we have seen, the legal system is based upon the social
ideals of democracy and the free market. 38 Now, the negative
critique of objectivism leads to a search for new ways of institu-
tionally expressing those ideals. 39 The tool for this search is
deviationist doctrine itself. 140
This search requires three things. First, we need a theory of
social transformation.' 4 1 Such a theory will provide standards
for identifying political and social programs which are "realis-
tic.' ' 142 Second, we need a conception of the social ideal to
guide us in reconstructing democracy and the market.
43
Third, we need to understand the proper relationship between
law and society. 144 The new institutional forms will have to be
expressed in legal categories.1
45
The social ideal is ascertained by generalizing aims shared
by liberalism, socialism and communism. 146 At the basis of
these three great secular movements is the idea that the "weak-
ening of social divisions and hierarchies would reveal deeper
individual and collective identities and liberate productive and
creative powers."' 147 The generalization of this idea proposed
by the critical legal studies movement can be stated in three
equivalent ways. 148 First, the fixed order of society should be
loosened. This means that the society's plan of social hierar-
chy and modes of human association should be made vulnera-
ble to "collective conflict and deliberation."' 49 No part of the
social order should be immune from "destabilizing strug-
137. Id.







145. See id. at 25.
146. Id. at 22.
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gle."' 150 A second form of the social ideal postulates that the
life chances and experiences of all persons should be freed
from the "tyranny of abstract social categories."'' 5 A person
should not be confined by his position in the division of
classes, sexes and nations. 52 The opportunities, experiences
and values which the present society conventionally links to
those classes should be "deliberately jumbled."'' 5 3 Third, the
contrast between the routine and the revolutionary should be
broken down. 154 Every aspect of everyday existence should of-
fer the possiblity of recreating the conditions of social exist-
ence.' 55 Social life should be made much less confining in
order to enable us to "overcome and revise" all the social and
"mental" structures in which we now live.' 56
Associated with this social ideal is a theory of the proper re-
lationship between law and society. 157 Law must be seen as
"the denial rather than the reaffirmation of the plan of social
division and hierarchy."' 58 The law should define a system of
rights which will counteract and destroy the maintenance or
recreation of any system of social roles and ranks that might
become immune to challenge by democratic processes.
159
Legal rights should give persons the tools for keeping society
in a permanent condition of "self-revision."' 160
E. This Social Ideal and the Theory of the Relation Between Law
and Society Lead to a Program for Cultural Revolution
The social ideal and the theory of the relationship between
law and society just described give the critical legal studies law-
yer a basis for a vision of "transformed personal relations."'
6 '









157. Id. at 24.
158. Id.
159. See id.
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The vision of cultural revolution includes the idea that the
self is "infinite" in that it can always transcend the limits of any
imaginative and social worlds it fashions. 63 The aim of cul-
tural revolution is remaking personal relationships by emanci-
pating persons from all constricting structures of divison and
hierarchy.16 4 Persons should be freed from preassigned roles
in a fixed system of social or gender contrasts. 65 Each of us
should be free to have the opportunities and experiences avail-
able to all categories of people. 66 We should be free to com-
bine and recombine any styles of life. 167 No way of living
should be closed to a person simply because he is in the wrong
cultural, legal or gender category. 68
F. The Social Ideal of Critical Legal Studies Can Also be Translated
into a Program for the Reconstruction of the State and the
Other Institutions of Society
The social ideal of critical legal studies gives rise not only to
a revolutionary program for cultural change, but also to a pro-
gram for institutional reform. 169 This program begins by rede-
fining the ideal of democracy. 70 This redefinition, in turn,
leads to proposals for the organization of the government, the
economy, and the system of legal rights.' 7 1 I shall discuss
these proposals in the next four sections.
G. The Social Ideal of Critical Legal Studies Leads to a Critique of
the Existing Democratic System and to a New Conception of
an "Empowered" Democracy
The critical legal studies movement takes seriously the ideal
of democracy and expands it into a program for the democratic
transformation of all levels of society. 172 What is the concep-
tion of democracy with which our system presently works?
The minimal core of the democratic ideal is the principle that
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government must not fall permanently hostage to any fac-
tion.1 73 Now, this minimal core of the democratic ideal makes
no sense if the government is embedded in a system of rigid
social divisons and hierarchies which limit the life chances of
individuals. 74 So, the minimal core must be expanded to in-
clude a demand for breaking apart all such structures.
175
Our system fails to satisfy this expanded ideal of democracy
in several respects. 176 First, our forms of economic and polit-
ical organization enable small groups to control the general
level of economic prosperity by making the important invest-
ment decisions. 77 Second, major areas of social life such as
factories, offices, hospitals and schools, are not subject to ef-
fective democratic control. Persons in such institutions are
burdened by arbitrary power.' 78 These areas of life are "cita-
dels of private power" immune from the risks of "party-polit-
ical conflict."' 179 Third, our politics are conventionally limited
to a very narrow range of policy alternatives.18 0 Whenever a
leftist movement gains political control on a program of wealth
redistribution, the normal political realities close in.' 8 1 Such
reformist schemes fail before being seriously tested.' 8 2 Consti-
tutional guarantees for limiting governmental power en-
courage postponement of and resistance to radical reforms.
8 3
The fear of wealth redistribution causes capital flight.'8 4 Elec-
toral support for the radical program evaporates)185 The re-
formers gradually turn to short-term goals which are
meaningless in the larger scheme of things.' 8 6 Before having a
chance to make any signficant impact on society, they lose the
next election. 187 This cycle recurs again and again. No party is
permitted drastic change. Thus, policy options are limited no
173. Id. at 27.
174. Id.
175. See id. at 27-28.
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matter what party has power.18 8
These impeding factors make it impossible for society to re-
alize the expanded ideal of democracy. 89 In order to establish
society that was truly democratic we might have to change
"every aspect" of our social and political structure. 190 Ideally,
a democracy should be a "self-revising" institution which
would provide "constant occasions to disrupt any fixed struc-
ture of power and coordination in social life."' 19 1
H. A Necessary Step Toward Creating an Empowered Democracy is
Reorganizing the Government
The structure of our present government interferes with
building an empowered democracy. 192 The very devices
designed to restrain governmental power also tend to "dead-
lock" it.'19 Our system is built on a foundation of checks and
balances and separation of powers which makes it impossible
to radically reform the American class structure. 194
There are several changes we should make. First, we should
multiply the branches of government. 9 5 To every "crucial fea-
ture of the social order" should be assigned a branch of gov-
ernment which would provide a forum for destabilizing conflict
over that realm of social life. 196 There should be no significant
aspect of social life free from democratic challenge and
change. The way to ensure this is to assign a branch of govern-
ment to oversee every such aspect for the benefit of the
people. 197
Now, if we multiply the branches of government, we will in-
crease the chances of conflict between these various
branches. 98 So, the second required change is building into
the government some method for resolving such conflicts
"cleanly and quickly."' 199 This method of resolving intragov-
188. See id.
189. See id.
190. Id. at 30.
191. Id. at 30-31.
192. See id.




197. Id. at 31-32.
198. See id.
199. Id. at 32.
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ernmental conflict should replace the system of checks and
balances.
200
The third change is making sure that the party in office gets
a genuine chance to try its programs. 20 1 We should eliminate
the stultification of checks and balances, separation of powers,
factionalism, and so on.
202
I. A Second Necessary Step Toward Creating an Empowered
Democracy is Reorganizing the Economy
The present economic system frustrates the development of
an empowered democracy in several ways. First, it permits
some people, through the accumulation of wealth, to reduce
others to conditions of dependence. 203 For example, employ-
ees, even when unionized, are forced to depend upon employ-
ers. 20 4 Second, the system permits small groups of people to
control overall prosperity by making the significant investment
decisions.2 0 5 Third, the system limits economic progress by
preventing decentralization. 20 6 Pressures toward oligopoly
and economies of scale make the notion of free competition
look like a romantic dream. 20 7 Fourth, the economy discour-
ages economic experimentation. 20 8 For example, the economy
imposes a rigid distinction between "task-defining" and "task-
executing" activities. 20 9 The people who define the tasks are
not the same people assigned to do the tasks. 210 Fifth, the sys-
tem makes it difficult to formulate and apply signficant
macroeconomic policies. 2 1' Any radical proposal for national
macroeconomic reform is stultified by the ability of both busi-
ness and labor to exert economic and political pressures in op-
position to change.
212




203. See id. at 32-33.
204. See id. at 33.
205. See id. at 32-33.
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problems by setting up a "rotating capital fund."213 Invest-
ment funds would be made available to "teams of workers or
technicians" under conditions specified by government.
2 1 4
Such conditions might include limits on disparities of income
or power within the group, limits on the power to accumulate
capital, and limits on the power to distribute profit as in-
come.2 15 The interest charged on the capital would constitute
the primary source of government revenue. 21 6 The differen-
tials between the various interest rates would provide the
means by which government would encourage "risk-oriented"
and "socially responsive investment." 21 7 The central capital
fund would be administered so as to encourage a continuous
flow of new entrants into markets.2 1 8 The government would
not permit enterprises to monopolize market power or to im-
munize themselves against competitive forces.2 19
A legal accompaniment to the rotating capital fund would be
the redefinition of property rights.220 The bundle of rights
making up what we now think of as absolute ownership would
be broken apart.22' Some of the strands would be given to the
government. Others would be allowed to remain in the hands
of private associations using the capital funds.
222
J. A Third Necessary Step Toward Creating an Empowered
Democracy is Defining a New System of Individual Rights
The present system of rights frustrates the development of
an empowered democracy in two ways.223 First, it assigns
property rights to individuals and lets them use economic
power to dominate others. 224 Second, it encourages us to con-
ceive of a legal right as something which can be exercised with-
out regard to the effects upon our communal life.225 Within












225. See id. at 36-37.
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the domain of the legally protected right, the right-holder is
encouraged to think of his activity as unconstrained. 226 This
frustrates the development of genuine community. In a true
community, each person is always prepared to give way to the
needs of the whole. 227 The concept of an inviolable right is
inconsistent with this need to be ever-ready to accommodate
one's own desires to the needs of the group.
228
A system of empowered democracy would establish four cat-
egories of rights. 229 The first category consists of immunity
rights.230 These rights would establish "nearly absolute" claims
to security against the government, other groups, and other
persons. 231 Examples of immunity rights are freedom to par-
ticipate in the political process, freedom to associate, freedom
to speak, rights to welfare, and rights to withdraw from estab-
lished groups and even from the territory itself.23 2 Now,
although such rights are "nearly absolute," they would not be
allowed to "defend power orders against democratic poli-
tics." 233 Presumably, this means that an individual would not
be allowed to use his rights to exercise power over others.
23 4
The second category consists of destabilization rights.
23 5
These rights would give the holder power to "disrupt estab-
lished institutions" and to destroy entrenched social hierar-
chies and divisions. 236 The government would stand ready to
enforce such rights by rooting out class structures theretofore
immune from democratic attack.
237
Market rights would constitute the third category. 23 8 These
would give the holders "conditional and provisional" claims to
portions of the social capital.2 39 These rights would not be ab-
solute or nearly absolute entitlements such as the property
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powers retained by the central government for organizing pro-
duction and investment.
240
The fourth category consists of solidarity rights.24 1 These
would set the standards for the relationships between the
members of the genuine communities.
242
K. The Program for Creating an Empowered Democracy Can be
Accomplished Gradually
It is a mistake to think that this transformation of society
must be accomplished in its entirety or not at all. 243 The pro-
gram can be accomplished in relatively modest steps 244 and
these steps would not require violent revolution. 245
L. The Critical Legal Studies Vision Leads to a
New Conception of Law Practice
The critical legal studies lawyer will practice law in a distinc-
tive way. 2 4 6 She or he will provide a legal defense for individ-
ual and group interests in such a way as to (i) make public the
underlying institutional hierarchies which give rise to the prob-
lem, (ii) subject that underlying structure to a "series of petty
disturbances capable of escalating at any moment," and
(iii) suggest alternative ways of organizing society so as to
more closely approximate the ideal of true community. 247 In
short, the lawyer will consciously strive to cause "social
destabilization" through the concepts and methods of devia-
tionist doctrine.
248
As society more closely approximates the critical legal stud-
ies ideal, the nature of law practice would change.249 There
would no longer be any sharp distinction between lawyers and
nonlawyers. 250 Several factors would be responsible for this.
First, legal doctrine would have come to be recognized as
240. See id.
241. Id.
242. See id. at 39-40.
243. Id. at 40.
244. Id.
245. See id.
246. See id. at 40-42, 110-11.
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nothing but moral, philosophical, and ideological argument. It
requires no special professional expertise to talk about these
things.2 51 Second, the present three-part system of govern-
ment, (judiciary, legislature, executive), would have been elim-
inated in favor of a government with a great many arms, many
of which whould engage in what are now regarded as uniquely
judicial functions. 252 Third, our present belief in the desirabil-
ity of "inherent institutional roles" would have been aban-
doned.2 53 Legal expertise would survive in the ideal society
only as a "loose collection of different types of insight and re-
sponsibility." 254 There would be no professional bar with its
unjustifiable claims to monopolize political power in the name
of expert knowledge and skills. 255
M. The Critical Legal Studies Vision Also Leads to a
New Conception of Legal Education.
Many come to law school with the "adolescent fantasy" of
acquiring the skills for bringing about desirable social
change. 256 But law school destroys their idealism. 257 They are
taught to think "realistically," to settle for high incomes and
subservience to client interests. Students are told that they will
be taught a powerful method of analysis. 258 But they quickly
learn that there is no special method. Legal analysis is cynical
manipulation of language in the service of whatever cause hap-
pens to be paying the bill. 259 They are taught that the existing
social and political order is arbitrary and probably unjustifi-
able, but unchangeable by any skills they are learning. 260
Thus, their prescribed adult role is serving the interests of per-
sons with arbitrary economic power by methods devoid of ra-
tional or moral content. 261
The critical legal studies law teacher should instill in the law
251. See id.
252. See id. at 31-32.
253. See id. at 111.
254. Id.
255. Id.
256. See id. at 112.
257. Id.
258. Id.
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student a sense of "living in history." 2 62 That is, the student
should be encouraged to experience herself as an "active and
conscious participant in the conflict over the terms of collective
life." 263 The student should also be instructed in the concepts
and methods of deviationist doctrine so that she can see the
possibilities for radical social transformation in the most tech-
nical legal problems.264 Above all, she should be taught how
to live in society without "capitulating to it."265 She will come
to see how to be part of society while working to radically
change it.266 In short, the law student will be given an under-
standing and ideal which will unify her consciousness and en-
able her to find genuine fulfillment in the cause of social justice
and personal liberation. 267
IV. EVALUATION
Because my main purpose in writing this paper is to simply
present some of Unger's basic themes, I shall not undertake
the kind of extensive analysis and evaluation which those
themes deserve. But I shall offer a few considerations with
which any adequate evaluation would have to deal.
A. Our Knowledge of Human Nature
Unger's identification of goodness and the realization of
human nature seems a useful way to begin a philosophical
analysis of law and society. This way of defining the good is
typical of the natural law tradition. Versions of the definition
can be found in Plato's Republic and in Artistole's Nicomachean
Ethics. A Writer could be in worse company.
But there are some difficulties in Unger's account. First, his
account of the relationship between the mind and the world is
difficult to reconcile with his claim that there is a unitary
human essence to be known. As we have seen, Unger says that
the very attempt of a mind to understand a thing (such as the
human essence) changes that thing. He relies here upon the
Liebnizian idea that the nature of a thing is a function of all the
262. Id. at 113.
263. Id.
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relationships in which that thing stands to other things. As
those relationships change so does the nature of the thing.
Now, if the human essence is changed by the very attempt of
the mind to grasp it, it is difficult to see how there can be any
nature "there" to grasp. As soon as a mind forms a belief
about human nature, that nature changes accordingly. Thus,
human nature is whatever it is believed to be. There is no uni-
tary human nature. Not only would the human essence change
as the beliefs of any one person about it changed, but there
would also be a different human nature for every mind trying
to understand human nature. There would be as many human
essences as there are minds. Thus, it seems that the very pro-
ject of understanding human nature destroys itself by dissolv-
ing its own subject matter.
Similarly, his account of the relationship between human na-
ture and history seems inconsistent with his claim that human
nature exists. Unger denies the existence of "fixed essences."
The Aristotelian conception of natures remaining constant
through time is a myth. Natural essences (such as human na-
ture) change with the evolutionary processes of history. Now,
if human nature is constantly changed by the social processes
in which it is embedded, in what sense is there a unitary human
nature at all? How is anyone justified in asserting that any par-
ticular cultural or political change is a "better" way of develop-
ing human nature than others? Given his own premises, how
can Unger legitimately claim that a fascist takeover would be
any less true to human nature than socialistic change?
Wouldn't he be compelled to say, if he were consistent, that in
a fascist society the natures of the members would become fas-
cist natures? If human nature is a chameleon which takes on
the colorings of its cultural environment, in what meaningful
sense is there a unitary human nature at all?
Unger claims that the human essence will reveal itself only in
a classless society which has destroyed all heirarchies of power.
But how can he possibly know this on his premises? It seems
that he is assuming some kind of nonhistorical insight into the
core of the human essence, an insight his own epistemological
premises deny him.
Thus, while Unger's theory requires knowlege of human na-
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B. Does Human Nature Change?
Unger rejects the Aristotelian theory of fixed essences. All
essences, including the human, change with the historical pro-
cess. But he offers no empirical argument. On its face the
claim seems implausible. What empirical grounds are there
for supposing that the capacities and powers defining us as
humans have ever been different or nonexistent? Was there a
time when the human essence did not include, say, the power
of intellectual activity, the power of love, the power of repro-
duction or the power of aesthetic experience? If so, Unger
gives us no reasons for believing it.
C. The Goodness of Human Nature
As a socialist Unger takes the Rosseauist line about the in-
herent goodness of human nature. We are potentially good
despite the fact that we constantly mistreat each other, cooper-
ate in unjust social systems and generally behave in all sorts of
evil ways. Human evil is caused by bad social systems. If we
lived in good societies then we would be good. In a classless
society lacking hierarchies of status, wealth, or power, the
human essence would show itself as it really is. True commu-
nity would flourish in a spirit of love and benevolence. We
would fulfill ourselves in public-spirited activities for the com-
mon good. There would be no envy, hatred or strife because
the social conditions which cause such emotions would have
been destroyed.
There is probably no way of decisively refuting this theory of
human nature. Calling attention to evil acts committed in ap-
parently desirable social situations does not conclusively settle
the matter. The socialist will say that the very existence of evil
conduct shows that its social context is not truly classless.
Nevertheless, it seems to me that the facts of human history,
everyday experience and introspection make such a strong case
for the conservative view of human nature that at the very least
we can put the burden of persuasion on the socialist. The facts
seem to show that evil social conditions are primarily caused by
conflicts and fault in the human heart. One need not labor to
imagine tension, conflict, hatred, envy, detachment, self-
centeredness, depression, despair and cruelty quickly arising
in Unger's organic groups. The members of the groups would
effortlessly find ways to arrange themselves in status
[Vol. 13
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heirarchies no matter what legal restraints were imposed. If,
for example, inequalities of wealth were prohibited, people
would find other ways of feeling superior to each other. Even
so simple a thing as facility with Unger's writings would suffice.
Indeed, one can argue in the spirit of Tocqueville that as the
opportunities for political and economic differentiation de-
creased, the obsession with status and hierarchy would in-
crease proportionately.
268
This is not to say that I accept the Calvinist view of human
nature. Any plausible account of human nature has to make
room for our potential for good as well as for evil. The impor-
tant challenge for political philosophy is identifying social
structures and patterns which take into account both our pro-
pensity for the good and for evil. A political program whose
success depends upon the eradication of human evil is certain
to fail.
D. Are All Heirarchies Morally Unjustifiable?
Unger assumes that all relatively stable hierarchies are ille-
gitimate. But surely he overstates the case. Some stable hier-
archies are justifiable and, indeed, necessary if society is to
make even modest progress. Consider, for example, the hier-
archy of scientific and mathematical scholars. There seems
good reason to believe that a person who has dedicated 40 or
50 years of her or his life to the pursuit of physics is qualified
to advise the nonscientific community on such matters. Would
one of Unger's "destabilization" right-holders be able to de-
stroy such hierarchies? If so, society would be the loser.
E. The Rejection of Formalism and Objectivism
I sympathize with Unger's rejection of objectivism and for-
malism. Surely it is mistaken to think that any set of social or
political ideals could be expressed in only one way. And surely
it is wrong to think that a person can be a competent judge
without having any unifying moral and philosophical princi-
ples. The very nature of a complex legal system such as ours
renders unworkable the program of mechanical jurisprudence.
But acknowledging that adjudication requires moral and
philosophical concepts does not force us to conclude, as Unger
268. See, e.g., 2 A. TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA ch. 13, at 55-60 (1966).
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does, that there is no difference at all between legal and ideo-
logical argument. Surely it is possible for a judge to argue by
analogy from case precedent or rely upon the legislative pur-
pose behind a statute without committing herself to the philo-
sophical framework grounding the precedent or statute. Not
only is it possible but it is often obligatory. Of course, there
are cases in which legislative purpose is unclear and cases for
which there are no compelling analogies. But there are also
cases in which legislative purpose is clear and cases in which
compelling analogies are at hand. In the latter situation our
legal system requires the judge to invoke the purposes and
analogies even if she or he disagrees with them on philosophi-
cal grounds.
A related point concerns Unger's tendency to find "con-
flicts" lurking throughout the law. It is difficut to disagree with
his claim that a given set of legal materials (cases, statutes, reg-
ulations) can always be developed in contrasting ways. No set
of legal materials could completely determine its future devel-
opment in a deductive way. But does this truism entail the
proposition that every qualificaton or exception to a legal prin-
ciple arises from some basic conflict of social ideals? Why, for
example, do we have to understand the relationship between
the doctrine of consideration and that of promissory estoppel
as arising from a clash between laissez-faire and communitar-
ian conceptions of society? Couldn't we say that both doc-
trines promote the purpose of encouraging and enforcing
promises that are made with deliberation?
F. Is Unger's Program Essentially Totalitarian?
On the surface it might seem that Unger's social ideal is an-
archistic. The reader is continually treated to the image of an-
gry and envious citizens smashing to pieces with their
destabilization rights social patterns or processes they dislike.
Unger repeatedly recommends continuous social and political
revolution.
But on a deeper level it seems that Unger's ideal requires a
much greater degree of governmental control than we now
have. There are several things to notice in this regard.
First, these destabilization rights would carry with them gov-
ernment oversight and enforcement. Unger recommends that
government agencies be establshed to police all areas of social
[Vol. 13
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life susceptible to the formation of categories and hierarchies.
Government would be omnipresent. If it is necessary to con-
tinually break down hierarchies government will have to be
eternally vigilant and prepared to act swiftly.
Second, although Unger defines a category of "immunity"
rights purporting to protect the individual against society, he is
careful to hedge the right with serious qualifications. Indeed,
as we have seen, he rejects the Lockean conception of inaliena-
ble rights. The right-holder must always be ready to give way
to the community's demands. In the organic society the rule of
law would be replaced by the rule of custom which, in turn,
would be defined by the social organism for its own collective
ends. It seems that the primary holder of rights would be the
community rather than the individual.
Third, Unger rejects Locke's "negative" conception of lib-
erty as freedom from external coercive contraints and accepts
Rouseau's "positive" conception of liberty as freedom to real-
ize one's true nature. From Rousseau's conception it is a small
step to the notion that a person should be compelled to be
free. What about all those in Unger's society of organic groups
who dislike socialistic reforms? Presumably they would be
forced to freely realize their human essences at the hands of
plaintiffs wielding destabilization rights.
Fourth, recall Unger's impatience with the political
processes of democracy. He would do away with checks and
balances and separation of powers. He wants a system in
which the party in power puts through its platform unimpeded
by political opposition. He wants basic investment decisions
taken away from private citizens and placed in a central gov-
ernment agency. He wants to multiply the branches of govern-
ment so that no area of social life is free from the community's
protective eye. He advocates a method for resolving conflicts
between government agencies "cleanly and quickly." Property
rights traditionally left in the hands of private citizens would be
transferred to government. All of these recommendations lay
the foundation for a degree of collectivization much greater
than anything Americans have experienced.
This general tendency toward collectivization and govern-
ment control in the name of the community will not surprise
those who are aware of the inevitable conflict between liberty
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and equality. It is a truism that the degree of liberty in a soci-
ety is inversely related to the degree of equality.
Unger responds to this classical conservative point by invok-
ing the classical socialist redefinition of liberty. But the issue
cannot be resolved with a definition. The question is whether
a society with Unger's recommended level of governmental
control would be desirable. And that question surely deserves
careful consideration.
G. Are Unger's Economic Proposals Plausible?
Unger's economic theories raise at least three questions.
First, there is the matter of incentives in the organic group.
Unger says that distribution would be based on need. One
would not earn income in proportion to merit, level of produc-
tive effort, or degree of market demand. The level of a per-
son's income would be determined by his need. And the level
of need would be determined collectively by the group. As
with any socialistic proposal the question here is whether cut-
ting the link between productivity and income would destroy
incentives. What would prevent a tendency for members of or-
ganic groups to become "free riders," relying on the efforts of
others? Unger offers the traditional socialistic response.
Members of organic groups would undergo personality trans-
formations in virtue of living in a classless society and would
no longer need crude economic incentives. They would spon-
taneously work selflessly for the common good. The problem
with this response is that there seems to be very little historical
evidence that cutting the link between productivity and eco-
nomic incentive works, at least outside the narrow limits of
closely bonded family units or very small communities of per-
sons tied together with strong religious or political bonds.
Second, Unger's recommendation that basic investment de-
cisions be made by the central government raises the question
of the relative economic merits of an economic system driven
primarily by free markets and one controlled from above by
centralized government planning. Of course, this is a large
question and I shall not go into it here. But Unger offers little
argument for the proposition that a tightly centralized econ-
omy of this kind could satisfy even minimal efficiency
requirements.
In addition, Unger does not specify the relationships be-
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tween the production decisions made by the organic groups
and the central planning authority. On the one hand, he says
that each organic group would decide for itself what to pro-
duce, how to produce it, and how to distribute the income. On
the other hand, he says that the central government would
make the important investment decisions for the economy as a
whole. It seems that there is some tension between these two
proposals.
Third, I do not think that Unger adequately deals with the
conservative claim that a substantial degree of economic lib-
erty is essential for the preservation of freedom. The point is
that keeping the basic investment decisions out of the hands of
central government makes it more difficult for the government
to exercise totalitarian control.
269
H. Meaning in the Life of the Lawyer and Law Student
I think that Unger has some valuable things to say about the
moral cynicism and fragmentation which pervade the lives of
many American lawyers. I also think that his criticism of legal
education is useful. It does seem that law schools often suc-
ceed only in conveying the ideas that legal reasoning is a so-
phisticated form of salesmanship and special pleading with no
intrinsic rationality and that there are not objective moral
values.
But I doubt that the only solution to these problems is dedi-
cation to the cause of socialism. Surely there are alternative
ways of living as a lawyer which make possible an honest and
integrated life.
L Can the Ultimate Meaning of Life be Found in Social and
Political Relationships?
Unger follows the socialist tradition in assuming that the ul-
timate meaning of life is fellowship with others. If we could
live together in mutual love and cooperation our deepest spiri-
tual problems would be resolved. And until utopian commu-
nity spirit is created, the next best alternative for finding
meaning in life is working politically to create a true
community.
This conception of meaning contrasts with the idea that the
269. See, e.g., M. FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM ch. 1, at 1-6 (2d ed. 1962).
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deepest questions of life must be faced in the privacy of the
heart.270 How will getting on good terms with Joe or Mary en-
able me to deal with death, fate, freedom, guilt, time, eternity
and the soul? Such questions must be responded to in some
way by every person and they cannot be resolved by tinkering
with social relationships. I do not mean to say that personal
relationships are philosophically or morally irrelevant. But I
do mean to deny that they could alone provide unifying mean-
ing. Suppose that we awake some morning to find ourselves
members of an organic group bound together by feelings of
genuine love. Wouldn't each of us still have to face the ques-
tion of death? It is a truism that each of us dies alone. But
then each of us must live alone as well, at least on the deepest
metaphysical level.
The contrast between ways of dealing with the question of
life's meaning gives rise to contrasting evaluations of politics.
For the socialist (as for all activists who see politics as "re-
demptive"), political activity is the meaning of life. The
greater the proportion of "public" to "private" activity in my
life, the more fulfilled I am as a human. The other vision sees
life's private dimension as potentially more important than the
public dimension because only in the former can the question
of one's relationship to Being be resolved. Political activity is
important but only instrumentally so. It is valuable insofar as
it helps establish necessary or useful conditions for each per-
son to deal with the matter of living and dying. But politics
cannot provide the spiritual unification that some hope to find
in it.
CONCLUSION
Unger's work merits attention as a serious effort to state a
systematic and comprehensive view of law and society from the
perspective of a non-Marxist socialist. It deserves the attention
of both socialists and nonsocialists. Socialists should study it
because it is an interesting recent attempt to justify the pro-
gram of democratic socialism. Nonsocialists who value liberty
should respond to it as a radical challenge to the foundations
of the classical liberal tradition. Nonsocialists would do well to
emulate Unger's sustained seriousness by articulating compre-
270. See, e.g., S. KIERKEGAARD, CONCLUDING UNSCIENTIFIC POSTSCRIPr (1941).
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hensive views of their own. Significant beginnings have been
made by such writers as Friedrich Hayek, John Rawls and Rob-
ert Nozick. But more needs to be done to place the values and
principles of classical liberalism in a comprehensive metaphysi-
cal perspective.
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